1. SIGTARP, the oversight agency of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), in its July 2009 report, vetted by Treasury, noted that the U.S. Government’s “Total Potential Support Related to Crisis” (page 138) amounted to $23.7 trillion. While this figure represents a backstop commitment, not a measure of total potential loss, it is nonetheless an astounding degree of support, in the form of liquidity infusions, credit extensions and guarantees, various other forms of assistance for financial institutions and other business entities affected by the financial crisis.
One example of the mechanics of these backstop commitments involved two of the major investment-banks which were at the forefront of the U.S. financial crisis, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan who, through their high-risk exposure to subprime debt and derivatives, received enormous financial assistance at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.
Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan received these direct liquidity infusions during the financial crisis via Fed disbursements through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and numerous other credit facilities. The two (according to ZeroHedge 4-1-11) “had the temerity to pledge bonds that had defaulted (i.e. had a rating of D)… as in bankrupt, and pretty much worthless. . . that have no value whatsoever. . .” Goldman Sachs received $24.7 million and JP Morgan $1.4 million on the worthless collateral (September 15, 2008).
Goldman Sachs pledged D-rated securities again September 29, 2008 and received $82.7 million (Citigroup received $102.8 million; Merrill Lynch – $217.8 million; Morgan Stanley – $261.0 million; UBS – $202.2 million).
U.S. citizens deserve nothing less than the same access to credit extensions for resolving liquidity issues of their own at the family level, that have been extended to major domestic and foreign financial institutions.
In addition, the same two investment banking giants, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, earned free interest (again at taxpayer expense) through their access to credit extensions at the Federal Reserve discount window. Within two years, Goldman Sachs was paying out $111.3 million in “delayed bonuses” for the years 2007 and 2009 (NY Times 12-15-10).
2. The initial credit extension outlay with The Leviticus 25 Plan ($18.0 trillion – assuming an 80% participation rate by U.S. citizens) would hardly be prohibitive, in light of the trillions of dollars in Federal Reserve and Treasury outlays over the past 5 years to major U.S. banking and financial institutions (Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bank of America, State Street Corp, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns) and major foreign financial institutions (Royal Bank of Scotland, UGS AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Barclays, Credit Suisse. Dexia, BNP Paribas).
The Federal Reserve’s various credit facilities, Discount Window transactions, emergency loans, Foreign Exchange swap lines, Interest on Excess Reserves (IOER) for foreign banks, and Treasury’s TARP and stimulus programs have done little to improve the financial status for the majority of American families. These government programs have also done nothing to change the dominance and risk profile of “too big to fail banks,” and they have done little to lessen the counterparty default risk in the global derivatives markets.
3. U.S. taxpayer dollars have been used to support the IMF bail-out of Greece. The U.S. funded at least $780 million (17.09%) of the July $4.6 billion IMF transfer to Greece (purportedly funding interest payments to hedge funds which had speculated in purchasing the high-risk Greek debt).
U.S. taxpayers also funded approximately $2.9 trillion of a massive 2014 IMF loan to Ukraine to help Kiev pay off creditors including Western banks, Gazprom (the big Russian oil company), and previous IMF loan payment obligations).
The U.S. Treasury Department followed that up by guaranteeing a $1 billion Ukrainian bond issuance.
If U.S. taxpayer funds are being used to bail out the citizens of bankrupt foreign nations, then U.S. citizens deserve equal access to their own money to resolve liquidity issues at the family level.
4. The U.S. government will be piling on trillions of dollars of additional debt over the next eight years – which will compound financial stress issues for American families for decades to come.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) confirmed the FY2015 budget deficit of $435 billion, slightly higher than the projected $426 billion. The CBO forecasts that the U.S. will add $2.887 trillion to the national debt by the year 2020 and an additional $6.553 trillion to the national debt by 2025. This growing national debt burden will prove to be a significant drag on economic growth, and it will not generate meaningful, broad-based liquidity benefits for American families. The U.S. Government will be forced into monetary and fiscal policies which will continue the gradual erosion in the purchasing power of the U.S. Dollar.
U.S. citizens must be provided with direct liquidity access through a Citizens Credit Facility, in order to reduce/eliminate debt at the family level and off-set the potentially devastating consequences of a future major fiat currency ‘reset.’
The Leviticus 25 Plan’s one-time credit extension of approximately $18.0 trillion to U.S. citizens’ Family Accounts and Medical Savings Accounts would set America on a new course. It would provide immediate and substantial liquidity benefits to American families. It would strengthen small businesses and reignite true economic growth in the U.S. economy.
The Plan would also stabilize the U.S. Dollar and strengthen the nation’s banking system.
5. There is a Biblical precedent for The Leviticus 25 Plan.
The Leviticus 25 Plan is justified upon the basis of its profound historical correlations with the Biblical year of the “Jubile” (The Book of Leviticus, Chapter 25). This Year was established by God to free Israelites from economic indebtedness and oppression. It provided individuals and families a fresh start, with economic liberties and a societal rebalancing to counter permanent and restrictive class structures.